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Abstract 
This paper takes up the concept of the ‘Just City’ (Fainstein 2010) and follows the conceptual 
orientation within an own ongoing comparative case study for Birmingham, Lyon and Zurich, trying to 
identify the 'democratic foundations of the Just City' (Carpenter, Dlabac, and Zwicky 2015; Dlabac 
2014). Socially just urban planning orientations, it is hypothesised, are favoured by corresponding 
national welfare state regimes and planning systems, by Europeanization processes and by a strong 
and cooperative mayoral leadership that favours the participation of the broader public above a more 
restrictive cooperation with the local business community. 
The second round of the European mayor's survey allows assessing the mayor’s agenda with regard to 
social justice: refusal of market solutions for attending housing needs; insistence on public delivery of 
services; and a strong adherence to integrated urban projects. Whereas welfare state regimes deliver 
little explanatory power, we find indications for the role of national planning systems and 
Europeanization processes. Considerable variation, however, remains at the level of the cities after 
accounting for cross-national variation. Besides a leftist political orientation, community-based urban 
leaders clearly distinguish themselves from business-oriented leaders. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has long been concern in the social sciences about issues surrounding social justice in the city. 
Urban geographers such as David Harvey (1973; 1996) are inherently interested in the spatial 
dimension of urban society, seeking to understand the interactions between society and space in an 
urban context, and in particular in relation to social justice (Merrifield and Swyngedouw, 1997). This 
has led to the development of the notion of spatial justice (Soja, 2010), seeking to explore the 
relationship between space and (in)justices in society, whether it be in relation to spatial segregation 
(the ‘unfreedom argument’) or the unequal spatial allocation of resources (the ‘unfair resources 
argument’) (Marcuse, 2009a: 3). Spatial (in)justice is defined by Soja as “an intentional and focused 
emphasis on the spatial or geographical aspects of justice and injustice” with the starting point being 
“the fair and equitable distribution in space of socially valued resources and the opportunities to use 
them” (Soja, 2009: 2). This spatial turn in relation to justice is also reflected by a renewed interest in 
Henri Lefebvre’s work (Lefebvre, 1968), in particular his notion of the “Right to the City” (Friedmann, 
1995; Harvey 2008) which he defines as a “demand …. [for] a transformed and renewed access to 
urban life” (Lefebvre, 1996: 158).  
The concept of social justice in the city has also been further elaborated recently in debates over 
“The Just City” (Marcuse et al, 2009), in particular as developed by the urban planner Susan Fainstein 
(2010). In her book of the same name, Fainstein presents the concept of “The Just City” as both an 
analytical concept as well as a political tool, aiming to set out a theory of justice that can be used to 
assess urban planning policies in different contexts. Her underlying narrative is that justice should be 
a guiding principle of urban planning policy, and should be given precedence in the face of an 
expanding neo-liberal ideology that in recent years has prioritised urban growth and competitiveness 
above social justice. In her book, she assesses the concept of the Just City through an evaluation of 
urban policy decisions using three core criteria related to outcomes (equity, democracy and diversity) 
applied in three case study cities: Amsterdam, London and New York.  
Underlying these three related concepts (social justice, spatial justice and the Just City) is the 
assumption that justice is a desired goal for society. As John Rawls’ writing on justice suggests (1971: 
4), there is an “intuitive conviction of the primacy of justice” that underpins the work of scholars of 
social justice in the city. Similarly, there is an understanding that policies formulated at the city level 
by planners under the direction of their mayors, should have an underlying rationale to reduce social 
injustice and social inequalities, in order to address “unjust geographies and spatial structures of 
privilege” (Soja, 2009: 5).  
While Fainstein’s 2010 framework offers a useful starting point for analysing the Just City, we argue 
here that there is one key aspect missing from her analysis, that is, the role that mayors, as the 
leaders of city institutions, can play in producing equitable outcomes in the planning sphere. We 
suggest here that enhancing our understanding of how mayors perceive their role in planning 
processes and the subsequent outcomes could help to project how mayors can influence policy to 
move closer towards the goal of the Just City in the future. Through access to a recent 
comprehensive survey of mayors in cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants in some 29 European 
countries (Heinelt et al 2018), a valuable cross-national comparative approach can be taken to 
explore current mayoral attitudes related to approaches to Just City policies. By exploring their 
attitudes towards planning and their political priorities, in the context of their particular national 
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spatial planning structures and welfare systems, as well as local agency factors, a better 
understanding can be grasped of mayoral positions towards policies that can support the Just City, so 
furthering our awareness of how barriers towards the Just City can be overcome. 
The aim of this paper therefore is to introduce a political science perspective into the debate around 
the Just City. Instead of analysing the micro-level dynamics of single planning projects, we shift our 
attention to the role of political leadership in supporting Just City policies, by exploring mayors’ 
perspectives on different policies and political priorities that could support just planning outcomes in 
the city. More specifically, we propose an international comparative framework for investigating the 
attitudes of urban political leaders to different aspects of policy-making related to the Just City, 
taking into account the national planning systems and welfare state regimes within which they are 
operating. Specifically, we seek to explore: 
1. What are the attitudes of mayors towards policies related to the Just City, such as housing, 
public services and integrated programs for large-scale projects, and how do these 
differences manifest themselves between countries? 
2. Within particular countries, how do mayors respond to individual Just City policy domains, 
taking into account local contexts? 
The following Section 2 develops Fainstein’s concept of the Just City, and sets out some of the urban 
planning domains that are mediated by the broader democratic institutions within the context of the 
Just City. Section 3 elaborates the comparative framework for analysing political leadership for the 
Just City, with reference to urban planning policies. In Section 4 we explore the planning orientations 
of mayors across different welfare state regimes and planning systems in Europe, followed by Section 
5, in which we analyse the role of mayoral leadership and local context in attitudes towards policies 
that support the Just City. Section 6 concludes with a summary of how perceptions of European 
mayors towards policies related to the Just City are manifest, in relation to welfare state regimes, 
national planning systems and local contexts, and the implications of these findings for the future of 
the Just City. 
 
2. The Just City Debate 
 
The starting point for this paper is Fainstein’s concept of the “Just City” (Fainstein 2009; 2010), in 
which the notion of equity takes a central position, that is: “a distribution of both material and 
nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not favour those who are already better 
off at the beginning” (Fainstein 2010: 36). Fainstein argues that to date, in discussions on social 
justice in the city, there has been over-emphasis by communicative planning theorists on democratic 
deliberation, whom she sees as focusing too heavily on planning processes and decision-making to 
achieve just outcomes. She argues that democratic procedures in planning do not necessarily 
produce equitable outcomes in the city, and there needs to be recognition of the differential 
outcomes of policy options in relation to urban justice.  
Democratic theory has, in Fainstein’s view, failed more broadly to demonstrate "adequate 
representation of all interests in a large, socially divided group, protecting against demagoguery, 
achieving more than token public participation, preventing economically or institutionally powerful 
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interests from defining the agenda, and maintaining minority rights" (Fainstein 2010, 29). Social 
programmes, she concludes, depend on a combination of pressure from below, political-bureaucratic 
receptiveness at national and local level, and majoritarian support by the broader public and by 
centre-left coalitions in the case of Europe. Accordingly, social programmes and redevelopment 
policies are often based on coalitions involving downtown business and conservative segments of the 
population, resulting in further suburbanization and segregation (Fainstein 2010, 167–168).  
In reaction to Fainstein’s thesis, some have argued that her criticism of communicative planning is 
unjustified. Fischer (2009) suggests that the communicative approach urges planners to critically 
reflect on their own ways of arguing and on hidden forms of communicative power. While most 
planning practices are indeed limited to the level of technical assessments, deliberation on social 
justice includes a higher level discourse on broader societal impacts and alternative social systems. 
Marcuse (2009, 95) takes another position, criticising Fainstein's concept for "accepting the existing 
structures, laws, and institutions as given", thus neglecting the power structures that lead to injustice 
in the first place. In an alternative world, citizens might enjoy the right to decent living and decent 
work, community-based interests and decision-making processes might be formally binding on 
development, private property rights might be seen as endowed with a social purpose, and city 
agencies dealing with economic growth might be limited by other municipal agencies dealing with 
education, incomes, environment and family welfare (Marcuse 2009, 97–98). The legitimacy of 
existing planning practices therefore needs to be challenged, placing those in power in the defensive 
position of justifying their approaches.  
Here we elaborate on Marcuse’s point, by introducing into the discussion on the Just City an analysis 
of political leadership through mayoral attitudes, explored within the the institutional frameworks 
that structure urban planning decisions, i.e. the welfare and spatial planning systems, as the 
democratic foundation of the Just City. We argue that institutional frameworks play an important 
role in contributing to social justice in the city, an aspect which has hitherto been neglected in the 
debates on the Just City. In “The Just City” (2010), Fainstein identifies four key urban planning 
domains through which urban political institutions can contribute to a more just city: urban 
regeneration including zoning; housing; public space and amenities; and mega projects. Table 1 
below elaborates on each of these domains, illustrating the parameters for formal political decision-
making, and the criteria that could be used for assessing just urban planning policies. Under urban 
regeneration, decisions around for example the location of regeneration areas can have a major 
impact on the spatial concentration of social groups and potential mixed communities. Similarly, 
decisions related to housing and in particular the provision of social housing impacts on spatial 
justice through access to affordable housing in certain locations. Providing inclusive public spaces 
and amenities that are open to all represents a further example of where political decision-making 
can impact on justice in the city. Mega projects, finally, usually include several of the aforementioned 
domains, requiring an integrated reflection of multiple concerns of the Just City. 
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Table 1: Urban planning domains and criteria for just urban planning, after Fainstein (2010) 
Urban planning domains  Parameters for formal local 
political decision making 
Criteria for assessing just 
urban planning policies at 
the local level 
Urban regeneration and land 
use  
Location of areas for 
regeneration, densification, 
residential use, mixed-use 
developments, affordable 
housing, public acquisition and 
use of land and properties 
• Ghettoization: avoiding 
spatial concentrations of 
disadvantaged groups 
• Gentrification: minimising 
displacement of 
disadvantaged groups 
Housing  Location and funding of public 
housing; incentives, grants and 
land for non-profit / 
cooperative housing; 
prescription of means test, 
rent supplements  
• Affordable housing: 
Creation and preservation 
of affordable and decent 
housing that is accessible 
to economically and 
socially deprived groups 
• Avoiding ghettoization and 
counteracting 
gentrification (see above) 
Public services and facilities Location and funding of 
schools, school mixing policies, 
public transportation, health 
services, elderly homes, 
recreation centres, community 
centres 
• Capabilities and 
recognition: High quality 
services ensuring 
opportunities for quality of 
life, health, bodily 
integrity, access to 
education and control over 
political and material 
environment for 
disadvantaged groups 
Public spaces Location, funding, and design 
of public spaces, green spaces 
• Shared spaces: Creation or 
transformation of public 
spaces and green spaces 
that are attractive and 
accessible to socially 
disadvantaged groups 
Mega projects Location and purpose of mega 
projects involving public 
investments and exactions 
from private developers 
(affordable housing, public 
uses) 
• Integrated projects taking 
into account issues of 
ghettoization, 
gentrification, affordable 
housing, shared spaces, 
capabilities and 
recognition (see above) 
Source: Authors’ extended elaboration based on Fainstein (2010) 
 
In this article, we concentrate on three key areas of planning policy in relation to the Just City, that of 
housing, public services and mega-projects. As can be seen from Table 1, these are core areas of 
political decision-making that can have a profound impact on the criteria used to assess the Just City. 
They relate directly to issues of ‘distributional justice’ through the provision of resources as well as 
opportunities to access resources,  through policies that work towards just outcomes, to ensure that 
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all social groups can take advantage of opportunities to use socially valued resources in the urban 
built environment (Soja, 2009). Through these policies, political decisions are taken that work 
towards just outcomes for citizens, through contributions to social and spatial justice in the city. The 
complex processes through which these just outcomes arise are detailed further in the following 
section, which provides a comparative framework for analysing political leadership for the Just City, 
and the contexts through which such outcomes are achieved. 
 
3. Comparative Framework: Political Leadership for the Just City 
 
In order to study the role of urban political leaders in promoting or hindering just urban planning 
policies, we develop a framework that allows for cross-national comparisons, taking into account 
national systems of welfare and planning, as well as local contextual conditions. We follow an 'actor 
centred institutionalism approach' (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995) and postulate that the regulatory and 
institutional context of urban systems through national welfare and planning structures defines a 
corridor of action for urban leaders: some options are made available, some constraints and 
incentives are introduced. Within this "feasible set", local political actors are able to manoeuvre. 
Urban political leaders, conceptualized as political actors with public visibility and accountability (as 
opposed to other influential local actors), may try to involve community groups into single planning 
projects in order to bring legitimacy to decisions. This aspect has been amply studied in a European 
research project exploring possible complementarities of urban leadership and community 
involvement at the neighbourhood level (Haus, Heinelt, and Stewart 2005; Heinelt, Sweeting, and 
Getimis 2006). However, political leaders may also take a more narrow route to cooperative 
planning, limiting themselves to cooperation with the local business community. 
Given that our case explicitly focuses on planning politics with a broader view on formal planning 
policies at the city level (i.e. housing, public services and large-scale integrated projects), it seems 
particularly relevant to account not only for the local context, but also for differing national planning 
and welfare systems, i.e. the regulations and policies at different state levels restricting or enabling 
particular policy options at the municipal level. It could also be argued, in an increasingly influential 
European Union context, that cities involved with European Union regional funding streams are 
increasingly shaped by the principles that frame such programmes. This process of ‘Europeanization’ 
(Hamedinger and Wolffhardt, 2010; Olsen 2002) involves not only the influence of the principles 
underlying funding streams such as the Cohesion and Structural Funds, but also the social and spatial 
justice principles underlying the wider European Social Model, one of the cornerstones of the 
European project (Faludi, 2007; Davoudi, 2005). This supra-national context should also be taken into 
account when considering political leaders’ perceptions and attitudes towards the Just City.  
In order to allow for a European analysis, we take a ‘cross-country’ approach as well as a ‘within-
country’ approach, with the assumption that mayoral preferences towards the Just City vary both 
within and between countries.  The following Figure 1 summarizes the key aspects that could impact 
on mayoral leadership with respect to policy preferences towards the Just City.  Each of the key 
aspects is elaborated on in turn below.  
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Figure 1: Comparative framework for the study of the political leadership for the Just City 
 
Drawing out the various elements sketched out above, we elaborate below on the underlying 
principles behind each aspect, to derive a number of working hypotheses which will be tested 
through empirical analysis. We base the various elements of the framework on existing typologies of 
‘welfare state regimes’ and ‘planning systems’, while also introducing aspects of the local context 
and mayoral leadership that might impact on preferences towards the Just City. These aspects will be 
tested through the hypothesis.  
 
3.1 Welfare state regimes 
In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990), Esping-Andersen presents a 
typology of welfare states based upon the principles of de-commodification, social stratification and 
the private–public mix. This typology results of an analysis of the arrangements between market, state 
and family in 18 OECD countries and puts forward 3 categories: 1) the social democratic, 2) the 
conservative-corporatist and 3) the liberal. Being a seminal work, validated by further research (Saint-
Arnaud & Bernard, 2003), Esping-Andersen’s proposal was not spared to scientific criticism: due to its 
lack of attention to gender issues (Lewis, 1997), but also for leaving aside countries in southern Europe 
(Ferrera, 1996) and not accounting for the peculiarities of eastern European post-communist states 
(Fenger, 2007). Fenger states that, “although there is a wide variety of different labels under which 
welfare states might be classified - each based upon different indicators - it is surprising to observe 
how persistent the clustering of countries is” (2007, p. 7). The author points out that the 3 types 
presented by Esping-Andersen tend to persist in different typologies, even when new categories are 
added.  
In table 2, we follow Fenger (2007) and present a typology of European welfare states that includes 
Esping-Andersen’s and adds the 4) rudimentary/Latin and 5) post-communist types. In 1) social-
democratic welfare states, the level of de-commodification and the taxes are high, as is the level of 
public expenditure. The benefits are universal, highly redistributive and do not depend on individual 
contributions. Correspondingly, well-being levels are also high. It is interesting to note that the 
countries within this type of welfare system, mostly Nordic, tend to also have high levels of female 
participation in the labour market. The 2) corporatist-conservative states, Austria, Germany and 
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France, are characterized by moderate levels of both de-commodification and government 
expenditures. The state tends to restrict its direct action to income maintenance benefits related to 
one’s occupational status and the principle of subsidiarity applies, meaning that the state interferes 
solely when the family can no longer provide. Female participation in the labour market is marked by 
the discouragement of married women. The 3) liberal welfare state type, found in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, is in its turn characterized by a low level of government expenditures, means-tested 
assistance and little redistribution of income, thus by high levels of inequality. The existing benefits 
cater mainly to a clientele of low-income, usually working-class, state dependents. The 4) rudimentary 
or Latin/southern European type is mostly characterized, as the label suggests, by the lack of an 
articulated social minimum and by diverse income maintenance schemes. In these countries, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and Greece, reliance on the family and voluntary sector is also a prominent feature 
(Bambra, 2007). 5) Post-communist welfare states “cannot be reduced to any of Esping-Andersen’s or 
any other well-known types of welfare states”, but a specific type of post-communist welfare states 
does not emerge from the empirical data analysed by Fenger (2007, p. 27). The author states that they 
can be characterised by the lower levels of their governmental programmes and the social situation. 
Table 2: Welfare state regimes and national planning systems 
Welfare state regimes Characteristics 
Social-democratic • High level of government expenditures 
• High level of decommodification 
• High taxes 
• High income redistribution 
• High female participation on labour market 
• High level of well-being 
 
Corporatist • Moderate level of government expenditures 
• Moderate level of decommodification 
• Provision of income maintenance 
• Low female participation on labour market 
• Principle of subsidiarity 
 
Liberal • Low level of government expenditures 
• Means-tested assistance 
• High level of inequality 
• Low level of spending on social protection 
 
Rudimentary • Lack of an articulated social minimum 
 
Post-communist • Moderate level of government expenditures 
Sources: Fenger (2007): Welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating post-communist countries in a welfare regime 
typology. Contemporary Issues and Ideas in Social Sciences. 
Simeoneva (2015): A comparative study of different Balkan spatial planning systems: the cases of Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Albania. 
 
Housing policies are conceived and implemented within the wider framework of public policies and 
particular types of welfare state systems, combining the efforts of market, state and households in the 
provision of housing (Matznetter, 2002). Barlow and Duncan (1994) were among the first to relate 
the  typologies of housing production and land supply to Esping-Andersen’s typology and concluded 
that: liberal welfare regimes tend to have large builders/developers who rely more on speculative 
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development gains than on building profits; in the social democratic regimes, because land supply is 
under public control, for profit builders must rely on building profits only; the corporatist type has a 
more fragmented building industry, but more speculative gains than the social-democratic regimes; 
finally, the rudimentary welfare states have the smaller builders and the highest speculative gains in 
the land development process. Other analyses have followed, including for example Kemeny’s 
(Kemeny, 2001) - that proposes a twofold classification of rental housing systems, an Anglo-Saxon 
‘dualist system’ and a Germanic ‘unitary market’, respectively linked with the liberal welfare state and 
the corporatist welfare state; and Balchin’s (1996) - that offers an analysis based on housing tenure. 
For Matznetter (2002), these attempts of linking housing and welfare regimes were still crude, and the 
literature would be much enriched by national case-studies, such as the one he proposes for Austria.  
Other authors have dedicated themselves to assess the importance of housing within the welfare 
state. According to Malpass (2008), the scholarly literature that has been characterizing housing either 
as the ‘wobbly pillar’ or the increasingly important cornerstone of the welfare state is more interesting 
to explain the past than the present of the relationship between them. He then suggests that “the 
capacity of housing to become a cornerstone of the welfare state is due to its capital intensive nature, 
which was precisely the reason given by Torgersen for arguing that housing was the wobbly pillar” 
(Malpass, 2008, p. 1) and that scholars must embrace both the role of housing within the welfare state 
and the potential for the housing market to influence and support the distribution and consumption 
of welfare services. Kemeny also points out the pressing need of working on the relationship of housing 
to other areas of welfare, such as transport, planning, labour policy and child care (2001, p. 68). 
For Dewilde and Decker (2016), housing policy is unique because, while other social services are mainly 
redistributed by the state, for housing, the market is the main mechanism of distribution, States only 
provide correctives. Conceiving “right to housing” as access to both decent and affordable housing, 
they define de-commodification as housing for all realized as a social right. Thus, they hypothesize that 
better access to decent and affordable housing mainly results from higher levels of welfare state 
policies. Besides finding support in empirical data for this hypothesis, Dewilde and Decker stress the 
importance of other processes and policies in the pursuit of the right to housing, such as “increasing 
income inequality, economic growth (before the crisis) and decline (after the crisis) impacting on wages 
and (un)employment, and processes of welfare state restructuring and retrenchment, in particular the 
implementation of austerity measures during the post-crisis years” (2016, p. 147). The impacts of the 
global financial crisis of 2007 have been unequally distributed across Europe and the social spectrum, 
more concentrated in the south and on low-income populations (Andreotti & Mingione, 2016).  
Departing from the discussion of welfare state regimes and their relation to housing and service 
provision, and accounting for the perturbances following the financial crisis, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H1a: Just City preferences are more prominent in countries with social-democratic and corporatist 
welfare state tradition, and less prominent in countries with liberal welfare state traditions. Mayoral 
ambitions and problem perceptions are less straightforward in rudimentary and post-communist 
welfare states, particularly in those countries most severely hit by the financial crisis of 2007. 
 
  
 10 
 
3.2 National planning systems  
There have been various attempts to draw up a typology of the different national spatial planning 
systems in the EU.  The most commonly cited typology comes from the EU Compendium of Spatial 
Planning Systems and Policies which outlines four traditions in spatial planning that broadly 
characterize the different approaches that can be found in Europe (CEC, 1997; also see Nadin & 
Stead, 2008), see Table 3. The ‘regional economic planning’ tradition is characterized by the broad 
term ‘spatial planning’, in that it combines economic and social aims with objectives of territorial 
cohesion. Central government is one of the main actors in addressing regional disparities and 
development pressures through public sector investment (CEC, 1997: 36). The second tradition, the 
‘comprehensive integrated approach "[…] is conducted through a very systematic and formal 
hierarchy of plans from national to local level, which coordinate public sector activity across different 
sectors but focus more specifically on spatial co-ordination than economic development" (CEC, 1997: 
36-37). In this case, planning institutions and mechanisms need to be responsive with a political 
commitment to the planning process.  
The third approach is the tradition of ‘land use management’, with a focus on land use management 
and control. Local authorities are the main actors in this tradition, although central governments set 
guidelines and oversee municipal action. The fourth approach is ‘urbanism’, based on regulation, 
rigid codes and strongly inspired by architectural and urban design considerations (CEC, 1997: 37).  
Table 3: National Planning Systems in Europe 
National planning systems Characteristics 
‘Regional economic 
planning’ tradition 
• Central government as main actor for counteracting regional 
disparities and public sector investments  
• Broad meaning of term spatial planning: social and economic 
aims 
‘Comprehensive 
integrated’ approach 
• Spatial planning through systematic and formal hierarchy of 
plans 
• Cross-sectoral coordination with focus on spatial co-ordination 
rather than economic development 
‘Land use management’ 
approach  
• Control of land use by local authorities, central state regulation 
• Narrow objective of sustainable development and growth 
‘Urbanism’ tradition • Rigid zoning codes and building regulations 
• Limited to architectural and urban design considerations 
Nadin & Stead (2007): European Spatial Planning Systems, Social Models and Learning. disP - The Planning Review, 44:172, 35-47, 
Farinós Dasi (ed.) (2007): Governance of Territorial and Urban Policies from EU to Local Level. Final Report of ESPON Project 2.3.2. Esch-sur- 
Alzette: ESPON Coordination Unit. 
European Commission (1997): The EU compendium of spatial planning systems and policies. Brussels. 
 
This typology was developed over 20 years ago, and a number of scholars have called into question 
its continued relevance, given the hybridity of models that has evolved in the intervening years.  
Complexity has been introduced, as the original countries learn from each other through processes 
of policy mobility, and as new member states have joined the EU introducing additional dimensions 
from their post-Communist frameworks (Tosics et al, 2010, ESPON 2005). Although the complexity 
and divergence of Europe’s spatial planning systems is clear (Reimer et al 2013), the four-point 
typology nevertheless provides a useful starting point for classifying Europe’s different spatial 
planning systems. 
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Based on this four point typology, it can be suggested that the regional economic approach arguably 
offers urban leaders the widest array of options for pursuing just urban planning policies, particularly 
if national grants for housing, public spaces and amenities, and mega projects with public 
involvement are available in relation to outcomes for social justice. The comprehensive integrated 
approach also favours the choice of Just City policy options for urban leaders, although in comparison 
to the ‘regional economic’ tradition, this approach makes just urban planning more dependent on 
the successful spatial coordination of public intervention across sectors and levels of government. In 
contrast, national planning systems based on the tradition of land use management or urbanism 
would seem the least favourable environments for urban leaders to engage in just urban planning 
policies. We can therefore suggest the following hypothsis: 
H1b: Mayoral preference for Just City policies such as large-scale integrated projects is more 
prominent in countries with a ‘regional economic planning’ tradition or a ‘comprehensive integrated’ 
approach, compared to countries with a ‘land use management’ or ‘urbanism’ planning tradition.  
 
3.3 Europeanization 
The process of Europeanization is a concept that has been extensively discussed in the academic 
policy literature, although not always with a common understanding among scholars about its 
definition (Olsen, 2002). Here we understand Europeanization as the process by which the EU, 
through its policies and governance processes, has an impact on member states’ own domestic 
policies and practices. This definition can be extended to include both ‘down-load’ and ‘up-load’ 
Europeanization, that is, the influence that the EU has on domestic approaches to policy and 
governance practicies (down-load), or vice versa, how individual member states have impacted on 
the EU’s policy agenda, through the adoption of domestic policy approaches at the EU level (up-
load). Horizontal, or circular, Europeanization can also take place, where policy mobility occurs 
between member states, or cities, without necessarily using the EU as a conduit. For example, this is 
the case when practice is transferred between cities, through networks such as Eurocities and 
URBACT (Kern, 2007).  
It could be argued that in the field of urban policy, the EU’s approach to addressing urban challenges 
within the framework of the European Social Model, has led to a number of practices and 
approaches being adopted in domestic practice, through the process of Europeanization (Carpenter, 
2013). Many of these approaches promoted through the EU’s Structural Funds, particularly the 
‘integrated sustainable urban development’ approach in the current programming period1, align 
strongly with policies related to the Just City. These include taking an integrated approach to tackling 
urban challenges, working in partnership with different urban stakeholders through the partnership 
principle, and engaging with local communities in a process of collaborative planning (Gonzalez 
Medina and Fedeli, 2015).In the light of the specific practicies promoted through the Structural 
Funds, in relation to urban development and the links with cities’ policies to support the Just City, we 
can propose the following hypothesis: 
                                                          
1 Indeed, national programs of the European Cohesion Funds for the period 2014-2020 often emphasize the role 
of cross-sectoral integration in large infrastructure projects, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes?search=1&keywords=integrated&periodId=3&country
Code=ALL&regionId=ALL&objectiveId=16&tObjectiveId=ALL 
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H1c: Mayors in countries that have been recipients of EU Structural Funds have a preference for 
integrated large-scale projects and other policies that support the Just City, particularly mayors in EU 
cohesion countries and in third countries entitled to Pre-Accession Assistance.  
 
3.4 Mayoral Leadership 
Whereas the previous sections were concerned with the national regulatory context for explaining 
cross-national variations, it is plausible that mayoral leadership for the Just City will vary according to 
the local context and personal traits of a particular mayor in question. Besides the obvious role of the 
mayoral ideology along a left-right political scale, with leftist mayors supposedly holding stronger 
support for extensive welfare policies, mayors may also have very different understandings on the 
role that local business groups and community representatives may have for their urban planning 
efforts. If we follow urban regime theory (Stone 1993), we would expect a mayor engaging in Just 
City policies to try to mobilize community groups and the broad masses in order to legitimize large 
scale urban projects that help ‘expand the opportunities of lower classes’. More economically 
oriented mayors, however, would rather limit themselves to cooperative relations with the local 
business community in order to develop and expand their city, even if at the cost of vulnerable 
population groups. More generally, however, mayors behave as simple care takers following a 
‘maintenance agenda’, simply carrying out the routine functions of city government.  
Table 3 is partly based on Getimis and Grigoriadou (2005), who create a fourfold typology of 
leadership styles by combining two different dimensions – the mayoral exercise of power 
(authoritarian vs. cooperative) and the mayoral predisposition for strategic change. For our purposes, 
we instead propose to investigate the first dimension more closely by distinguishing various ideal 
types of power sharing. This is because, particularly with regard to planning policies aiming at more 
social justice, it should make a difference, whether mayor’s cooperative behaviour is directed 
towards business representatives or further expanded towards societal actors (Stone 1993). 
Table 3: Cooperation styles for mayoral leadership 
Exercise of 
power 
Ideal types Characteristics 
Cooperative 
(‘power to’) 
Community-based • Multilateral agenda setting, based on bargaining and 
deliberation, involving wide range of societal actors 
 Business-oriented • Multilateral agenda setting, based exclusively on 
bargaining and deliberation with business 
representatives 
Authoritarian 
(‘power over’) 
City boss / care taker • Hierarchic command and control, unilateral agenda 
setting, relying on positional competence as mayor 
Source: Own elaboration after Stone (1993) and Getimis and Grigoriadou (2005) 
 
We propose the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Community-based urban political leaders will favour Just City policies, whereas business-
oriented leaders will tend to deny the need for such policies. 
H2b: Leftist mayors will favour Just City policies clearly more than rightist mayors 
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H2c: EU-oriented mayors will rather follow an ‘Europeanised’ urban development strategy, favouring 
integrated large-scale projects coupled with Just City policies. 
Since the local context will additionally affect mayoral attitudes and policy preferences, we further 
account mayor’s perception of the municipal financial situation, for the city type (core cities, 
agglomeration, more isolated cities), and the size of the city.  
 
4. Planning Orientations across Welfare States Regimes and Planning 
Systems in Europe 
 
As previously stated, theoretical and empirically based literature points to close knitted links between 
welfare state regimes and the provision of housing and other public services (see 3.1.). However, the 
survey data regarding mayors’ attitudes towards housing does not strongly support our Hypothesis 1a, 
since the averages for perceived need for housing do not show large variations according to welfare 
state type.  
In contrast to our expectations, mayors in social-democratic countries do not seem to be particularly 
skeptical towards the market when it comes to addressing housing needs. mayors in Norway today 
even seem to be significantly more inclined towards market solutions than in many corporatist and 
even some rudimentary and some post-communist welfare states.  
Nordic countries’ welfare states are categorised together as social-democratic, however, literature 
tells us not only that they are in constant negotiation and adjustment in regard to changing political, 
economic and social forces (Pedersen & Kuhnle, 2017), but also that housing policies and housing 
markets vary much across these countries (Andersen, Andersson, Wessel, & Vilkama, 2016). Compared 
with the other social-democratic states, Norway and Denmark have stronger social separation 
between renting and owning, and thus more dual systems. But also, like Sweden, Norway has large 
cooperative sectors, that contribute to mitigate the duality and may account for the lower 
preoccupation of mayors towards providing housing (Andersen et al., 2016). 
Similarly, a corporatist tradition is not necessarily linked to a more interventionist stance, as can be 
seen with the average values in Germany and Belgium. Rather, we should highlight more 
interventionist predispositions in corporatist France and Italy.  
The most market-sceptical and interventionist views, however can be found in Spain, indicating 
particular pressures and ambitions in a country with a rudimentary welfare state that has additionally 
been shaken hardly by the global financial crisis of 2007. The housing problem became critical in Spain, 
but the housing issue also became very present in the public and local political spheres, with the 
emergence of strong right to housing social movements, like the Platform of Mortgage Victims (PAH) 
movement (Weerdt & Garcia, 2016), and the success of political actors coming from the ranks of these 
movements like Ada Colau in Barcelona. 
 14 
 
Figure 2: Perceived need for housing intervention by country and welfare state regime 
  
Notes: Graphs depicting national averages and 95% confidence intervals. Cyprus, Ireland, Latvia, 
Romania and Slovakia not reported due to low response rates with less than 20 observations. Iceland 
with four observations is included since the high response rate ensures a reasonable representation 
of the national population of cities with more than 10’000 inhabitants. 
 
With regard to the form of service delivery (Figure 3), in turn, mayors in social-democratic countries 
correspond to our expectations, by supporting either public private partnerships or purely public 
service delivery. Again, we find mayors in corporatist France and Italy to be more supportive of a purely 
public delivery of services, but they are even surpassed by their colleagues in financially troubled Spain 
and Greece. This was not the case in Portugal, however, possibly indicating a stronger mayoral 
acceptance of the wide-ranging reforms induced by the Troika. Literature shows that the austerity 
policies implemented, that had deep impacts in the capacity of the Portuguese welfare state, were 
justified by a narrative around Portugal’s incapacity to restore its public and administrative institutions 
and its economy (Seixas, Tulumello, Corvelo, & Drago, 2015).  
Surprisingly, mayors in liberal countries are way less supportive of private service delivery, than 
expected. Private service provision is actually only supported in the Czech Republic, Albania and Poland 
from the post-communist country group. As can be seen in the plot, however, there is large variation 
of current attitudes within this residual group of welfare states. Mayors in Hungary and Lithuania seem 
to be about just as supportive of service provision by the public authorities as their colleagues in Spain 
and Greece. 
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Figure 3: Support for public service delivery by country and welfare state regime 
 
Note: See notes for Figure 2. 
 
In line with our expected hypothesis H1b, mayors in countries with regional economic planning 
system do indeed emphasize the need to develop integrated programs for important urban projects, 
citing this approach as their second or third priority among eleven possible planning strategies 
(Figure 4). This fits with the regional economic planning perspective that emphasizes both social and 
economic objectives in an integrated approach (Magnier et al, 2018 forthcoming). However, this is 
clearly less often the case in most of the countries with a so-called “comprehensive integrated 
planning system”, which is also included in the hypothesis. This approach aims to provide integration 
across sectors and/or governance levels, yet it seems that integrated programs for larger urban 
projects are not a common tool in these countries. As Reimer et al (2013) emphasize however, 
countries do not necessarily fit neatly into one category, and can display elements of hybridity in the 
characteristics of their planning systems, with evolution over time in their objectives, and planning 
modes and tools. Indeed, Germany, that has – before unification – been separated into a Western 
‘comprehensive integrated’ and an Eastern ‘regional economic’ approach, seems to deviate from the 
other ‘comprehensive integrated’ planning systems, displaying a stronger support for integrated 
programs. The attested hybridization of the German planning system towards the ‘regional 
economic’ group (ESPON, 2005) is also evidenced by the long-standing area-based integrated 
programme, Soziale Stadt (Social City) that was introduced in the late 1990s (BMVBS, 2008). 
In respect of our hypothesis H1c, it would appear that European approaches to urban policy have 
had an influence on mayoral preferences for integrated programmes, where the dominant planning 
system would not suggest this to be the case. For example, the dominance of the integrated 
programme as a planning instrument in the Czech Republic, Albania and Greece seems to point to 
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the role of Europeanisation of urban planning in some countries entitled to EU Cohesion Funds and 
Pre-Accession Funds. Despite their more narrow planning traditions of land use management and 
urbanism, data from mayors in these countries suggest that integrated programmes are given 
priority within a city’s urban development strategies.  The EU puts particular emphasis on an 
integrated approach to sustainable urban development and in these countries (Czech Republic, 
Albania and Greece), processes of download Europeanization could have played a role in 
disseminating the importance of taking an integrated approach in urban projects (Carpenter J, 2013). 
In the 1990s, France, England and the Netherlands were particularly influential in shaping the EU’s 
approach to urban policy, although the low scores in Figure 4 for England illustrate more recent 
policy developments, as there is very little public funding now available for urban projects, and thus 
mayors were unlikely to cite integrated programmes as a priority, given the current policy climate.  
Figure 4: Importance of integrated programs by country and national planning systems 
 
Note: See notes for Figure 2. 
 
So far, we have looked at single attitudes of mayors regarding separate planning domains. In order to 
find out how mayors actually combine these central variables into sets of attitudes towards Just City 
policies, we have performed a cluster analysis (variables standardised to 0-10). The three cluster 
solution2 can be characterized by the average values on each variable in Figure 5: 
                                                          
2 The 3-cluster-solution seems to be best with a Duda/Hart-Index of 0.75. The 2-cluster-solution has a lower 
Duda/Hart-Index of only 0.62. Mayors in Denmark and Netherlands are not included in the cluster analysis, due 
to incomplete national questionnaires on the items used. 
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Figure 5: Mean value by cluster (standardized) 
 
Note: The three variables used for cluster analyses have previously been standardised to a scale from 
0 to 10. 
Mayors assigned to cluster 1 can thus be interpreted as ‘limited-sectoral’, since they do not generally 
question the need of publicly delivered services, but being ambivalent regarding the need of housing 
interventions and least likely to engage in integrated large-scale projects. Mayors of cluster 2, 
although similarly disinclined to engage in integrated large urban projects, can be labelled ‘sectoral-
interventionists’, since they fully embrace the need for public housing intervention and since they 
most forcefully insist on public service delivery. Mayors of cluster 3, finally, are clearly supportive of 
integrated programmes, taking an intermediate stance towards public housing interventions and 
public service delivery. 
In Table four we list the countries sorted according to their shares of mayors pertaining to the 
limited-sectoral cluster, giving an overview also on the shares for the other two clusters and on the 
single countries’ regulatory contexts. The table allows us to make a more encompassing assessment 
of our hypotheses 1a-c, so fare discussed only separately for each of the Just City planning policies.  
 Table 4: Share of mayors assigned to various clusters by country 
Country 
Cluster 1:  
Limited-
sectoral 
Cluster 2:  
Sectoral-
interventionist 
Cluster 3: 
Integrated Total Welfare State Planning System EU-status 
  % % % N      
Norway 84.2 5.3 10.5 19 social democratic comprehensive integrated Third country 
Iceland 75.0 0.0 25.0 4 social democratic comprehensive integrated Third country 
Switzerland 68.9 15.6 15.6 90 liberal comprehensive integrated Third country 
Slovenia 65.2 26.1 8.7 23 post-communist comprehensive integrated EU Cohesion country 
England 63.3 16.7 20.0 30 liberal land use EU 
Serbia 61.2 16.3 22.4 49 post-communist comprehensive integrated Pre-Accession country 
Sweden 59.8 32.8 7.4 122 social democratic comprehensive integrated EU 
Belgium 58.7 12.8 28.4 109 corporatist land use EU 
Lithuania 57.1 14.3 28.6 28 post-communist regional economic EU Cohesion country 
Austria 56.7 10.0 33.3 30 corporatist comprehensive integrated EU 
Poland 55.2 8.0 36.8 125 post-communist comprehensive integrated EU Cohesion country 
Croatia 55.2 13.8 31.0 29 post-communist comprehensive integrated EU Cohesion country 
Portugal 52.1 19.2 28.8 73 rudimentary regional economic EU Cohesion country 
Italy 45.3 40.3 14.4 201 corporatist urbanism EU 
Germany 42.9 16.1 41.0 529 corporatist comprehensive integrated EU 
Albania 34.5 3.4 62.1 29 post-communist urbanism Pre-Accession country 
Czech Republic 32.7 4.1 63.3 49 post-communist land use EU Cohesion country 
Greece 29.2 12.5 58.3 96 rudimentary urbanism EU Cohesion country 
Hungary 27.9 27.9 44.3 61 post-communist regional economic EU Cohesion country 
Spain 26.1 48.2 25.7 245 rudimentary urbanism EU 
France 15.5 27.6 56.9 58 corporatist regional economic EU 
Total 44.6 22.7 32.8 2058      
Remarks: Countries sorted by share of mayors assigned to the ‘limited-sectoral’ cluster. Shares for Cyprus, Ireland, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia not reported 
(low response rates with less than 20 observations). Iceland with four observations is included since the high response rate ensures a reasonable 
representation of the national population of cities with more than 10’000 inhabitants. Netherlands and Denmark missing (incomplete national questionnaires).   
 At the top of Table 4 we find the non-EU countries Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, with more than 
two thirds of mayors belonging to the ‘limited-sectoral’ cluster. Even though, at the aggregate level, 
the social democratic welfare regimes of Iceland and Norway displayed high values with regard to 
public service delivery, the share of mayors combining such an attitude with housing interventionism 
is negligible in these countries (in contrast to EU-member Sweden). Predictably, we find the liberal 
welfare states of England and Switzerland at the top of the list given their high share of ‘limited-
sectoral’ mayors. In contrast, countries entitled for Cohesion and Pre-Accession Funds and countries 
with regional economic planning approach tend to have higher shares of mayors of the integrated 
cluster (France, Hungary, Greece, Czech Republic, Albania – but not Slovenia). Lastly, EU-member 
countries without such entitlement and planning system show higher shares of mayors with a 
sectoral-interventionist strategy (Spain, Italy, Sweden). As significant beneficiaries of EU Structural 
and Cohesion Funds in previous funding periods, Spain and Italy have been influenced by the EU in 
developing their own domestic urban policies along EU lines (Gonzalez et al  2017). This could have 
influenced the degree to which mayors in these countries support policies related to the Just City in 
housing and public services, that are in line with the European Social Model.  
From this general pattern, Germany and Austria stand out with substantial shares of mayors engaged 
in integrated projects. Hamedinger et al (2008) illustrate how the process of Europeanization has 
impacted on cities in each of these countries, Dortmund (Germany) and Graz (Austria), showing that 
the integrated approach is key in both cities (although pre-existing in the case of Dortmund due to 
the legacy of the Soziale Stadt programme).   
To conclude this section, we realize that national patterns of mayoral attitudes towards Just City 
policies are less contingent on welfare state traditions (H1a) than on national planning systems and 
processes of Europeanisation (H1b-c). 
 
5. The Role of Mayoral Leadership and Local Context 
 
Let us now take a closer look at individual mayors and variation of attitudes within the set of 
European countries covered in the survey. We thus ignore the differences between countries 
discussed above by inserting fixed country coefficients into the following set of regression analyses. 
When looking at single variables (Table 5), interventionist views of mayors towards housing and 
service delivery clearly decrease the more a mayor positions himself or herself towards the right 
political spectrum (models 1 and 2). The perceived need for housing intervention coincides with 
mayors ascribing an important role to consultation by and participation of residents with regard to 
policymaking and public decision-making, whereas business-oriented mayors are more open to 
public-private or private service delivery. When holding left-right self-positioning and business-
orientation constant, mayors in core cities are significantly less insistent on a public delivery of 
services, as compared to city mayors in the agglomeration or more rural areas. With regard to a 
mayoral priority for integrated large-scale urban projects (model 3), left-right self-positioning is not a 
relevant factor. Instead, individual orientation towards the EU and supranational organisations 
significantly affect whether integrated programs have been chosen as the most important urban 
development strategy. This finding gives further support to the role of Europeanisation for urban 
planning, yet this time accounting for mayoral variations within countries, rather than general 
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patterns in the previous cross-national comparison. Moreover, larger cities seem to give significantly 
more importance to integrated programs, compared to smaller cities. 
 
Table 5: Regression models on single domains of Just City policies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Need for housing intervention Public service delivery Integrated programs (dummy) 
    
Openness to community 
involvement 
0.0271*** -0.00308 0.0419 
 (3.30) (-0.79) (1.70) 
Dependency and 
cooperation with local 
business community 
-0.0635 -0.0928* -0.526 
 (-0.77) (-2.34) (-1.85) 
Dependency and 
cooperation with EU and 
supranational organisations 
  0.146* 
   (2.57) 
Left-right self-positioning 
(0-10) 
-0.127*** -0.0562*** 0.0153 
 (-12.31) (-11.37) (0.49) 
Mayoral perception of 
municipal financial 
situation 
-0.0315 -0.0114 -0.00449 
 (-1.51) (-1.17) (-0.08) 
City type (reference: city 
beyond a larger functional 
urban area) 
   
    
- core city of larger 
functional urban area 
0.103 -0.0924** -0.104 
 (1.37) (-2.58) (-0.49) 
- commuting zone of larger 
functional urban area 
0.0270 -0.00944 -0.155 
 (0.56) (-0.41) (-1.08) 
Municipal population size 
(log.) 
-0.0218 0.0128 0.190 
 (-0.63) (0.78) (1.94) 
Constant 3.575*** 2.521***  
 (9.64) (14.39)  
R2 0.119 0.094  
Pseudo-R2   0.011 
N 1924 1927 1889 
t statistics in parentheses. OLS regressions for models 1 and 2, binomial logistic regression for model 3. All 
models with country fixed effects (not reported). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In Table 6 we try to explain the set of attitudes of individual mayors as captured by the three clusters 
described in the previous section. We see that a mayor’s openness to community involvement, 
previously explaining a more interventionist approach to housing policies, gives a better explanation 
for the integrated overall pattern than for the mind set dealing with housing and public services in a 
strongly sectorized way (models 2 and 3). For the cluster characterized by integrated programs and 
intermediate levels of interventionism in housing and public services, we note the remaining impact 
of the mayoral orientation towards the EU, thus giving further evidence to the role of 
Europeanisation of urban planning. 
Moreover, city size previously explaining the importance of integrated programs remains pertinent 
to such an integrated overall approach. Since the integrated overall approach puts less emphasis on 
housing intervention and public service delivery, balancing these aims with more business-oriented 
considerations, political ideology seems to have no significant impact (model 3). Instead, mayors with 
a more leftist political orientation are more likely to pursue a sectoral-interventionist approach 
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(model 2), and significantly less likely to take a limited-sectoral approach towards Just City policies 
(model 1). Interestingly, whereas mayoral openness to community involvement and large city size 
are significant predictors for an integrated overall approach, the rejection of such openness and a 
small city size seem to advance a limited-sectoral strategy when measured against the ideal of the 
Just City (model 1). 
Table 6: Binomial logistic regressions explaining probability of a mayor to adhere to the single clusters 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Cluster_1: 
Limited-sectoral 
Cluster_2: 
Sectoral-interventionist 
Cluster_3: 
Integrated 
    
Openness to community 
involvement 
-0.0552** 0.00820 0.0440* 
 (-2.69) (0.34) (2.01) 
Dependency and 
cooperation with local 
business community 
0.300 0.00384 -0.363 
 (1.47) (0.02) (-1.57) 
Dependency and 
cooperation with EU and 
supranational organisations 
  0.165** 
   (3.29) 
Left-right self-positioning 
(0-10) 
0.188*** -0.295*** 0.0300 
 (7.10) (-9.16) (1.08) 
Mayoral perception of 
municipal financial 
situation 
0.0748 0.0152 -0.0672 
 (1.46) (0.25) (-1.27) 
City type (reference: city 
beyond a larger functional 
urban area) 
   
- core city of larger 
functional urban area 
-0.126 0.140 0.0114 
 (-0.67) (0.66) (0.06) 
- commuting zone of larger 
functional urban area 
-0.138 0.314* -0.0521 
 (-1.18) (2.20) (-0.42) 
Municipal population size 
(log.) 
-0.246** 0.107 0.191* 
 (-2.85) (1.08) (2.17) 
Pseudo-R2 0.040 0.060 0.015 
N 1804 1799 1789 
t statistics in parentheses. All models with country fixed effects (not reported). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Taken together, our models show some indications that political leaders with a community-based 
cooperation style tend to be more inclined for a Just City policy agenda, whereas business-oriented 
leaders tend to be more willing to sacrifice public service delivery by opting for public-private or 
private solutions (H2a). In contrast to our hypothesis 2b, however, leftist political orientation does 
only favour a decisively sectoral-interventionist strategy, whereas an overall integrated strategy does 
not seem to require a leftist ideology. Lastly, Europeanisation of urban planning is not only relevant 
for explaining cross-national variation, but it’s effect is also affirmed for explaining single mayor’s 
choice of approach towards the Just City. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have set out to investigate the role of political leadership and the national 
regulatory context for approaching the Just City ideal. Of course, the predispositions of mayors do 
not guarantee that the respective policies are actually enacted in that particular city, but 
nonetheless, mayoral attitudes are a good measure for the general political mood of a city, and it will 
be an important precondition for planners to succeed in putting forward Just City strategies in the 
important fields of social housing, public services and integrated urban projects. 
As shown in the empirical parts of the paper, mayoral attitudes are indeed partially shaped by 
national planning systems and processes of Europeanization, although these influences interact in 
complex ways. Just as importantly, however, we showed that mayors are not captives of their 
national and supranational structures, but their ideology and cooperation strategies allow for 
deviations from the respective national mainstream. Mayors oriented towards communities and 
willing to grasp the opportunities offered by the European Structural Funds do have it in their hands, 
to actually putting their ideas of the Just City into practice. 
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Appendix 
Table 7: Operationalization, question wording and measurement (POLLEADER II) 
Concept Question wording 
Original scale and 
transformations 
Attitudes regarding 
urban planning 
“On the basis of your experience as a mayor, how much do 
you agree with the following statements?” 
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) 
- Need for housing 
intervention 
- The market is the best way to attend housing needs 
Inverse scale for 
disagreement with 
statement: 1 (strongly 
agree) to 5 (strongly 
disagree) 
Preferred form of service 
delivery 
“Please indicate which form of service delivery is most 
preferable to the following tasks:” 
1=private sector, 
2=public private 
partnership, 3=public 
sector 
- Public service 
delivery (index) 
- Public transport 
- Maintenance of school buildings 
- Hospitals 
- Care homes for the elderly 
Index: average value of 
four items with 
theoretical minimum of 
1=private sector and 
maximum of 3=public 
sector 
Importance of planning 
strategies 
“To realise his/her ambitions to enhance or preserve the 
qualities of the local territory (through construction, new 
infrastructures, natural resources and environment 
preservation), a mayor may adopt different tactical 
orientations. Among the following options [A to K], which 
strategies are in your opinion, those most likely to succeed?” 
3=most important, 
2=second priority, 
1=third priority, 0=not 
listed among most 
important three 
- Integrated 
programs 
- Develop integrated programs for important urban 
projects [K] 
Other priorities to chose from: establish good construction 
and planning guidelines [A], anticipate and dominate the real 
estate market [B], impose negotiated criteria in the 
development operations [C], ensure the cooperation of 
creative architects [D], involve local society in defining 
territorial priorities [E], obtain technical support from upper 
levels of government or public consulting organizations [F], 
anticipate the environmental and social impacts of projects 
[G], co-operate with neighboring municipalities on agreed 
priorities [H], have good contacts with big enterprises and 
investors [I], have good information on best practices and 
innovations of other local governments [J] 
0 (no priority) to 3 (first 
priority). 
For regression analyses 
we use a dummy for 
most important strategy 
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Notions of democracy 
«How much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements?” 
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) 
- Openness to 
community 
involvement 
(index) 
- Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the 
opportunity to influence local government policies 
- Disagreement with: Political representatives should 
make what they think are the right decisions, 
independent of the current views of local people 
(inverted scale) 
- Residents should participate actively and directly in 
making important local decisions 
- Residents should have the opportunity to make their 
views known before important local decisions are 
made by elected representatives 
Index: sum of four items 
with theoretical 
minimum of 1=very 
closed and maximum of 
5=very open 
Dependency and 
cooperation with various 
actors 
“If you consider this most important challenge: to what 
extent would you say that your administration depends on 
the cooperation and support of the different actors below in 
addressing this problem. Dependent upon cooperation or 
support of …” 
1 (no dependency) to 5 
(highly dependent) 
- Dependency and 
cooperation with 
local business 
community 
- The local business community 
For regression analyses 
we use a dummy 
indicating a dependency 
on business community 
of 3 or more, while 
expressing lower values 
on each of the the three 
following items: 
‘neighbourhood 
organizations’, 
‘voluntary 
organizations’, 
‘individual citizens’. 
- Dependency and 
cooperation with 
EU and 
supranational 
organisations 
- The EU and other supranational organizations  
Left-right self-positioning 
“There is often talk about a left-right dimension in politics. 
Where would you place yourself on a left-right dimension?” 
0 (left) to 10 (right) 
Mayoral perception of 
municipal financial 
situation 
“How would describe the financial situation of your 
municipality?” 
1 (very poor) to 5 (very 
good) 
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Table 8: Mean values for several independent variables 
Country 
Number of 
observations 
(N) Left (0)-right (10) self-
positioning 
Openness to 
community 
involvement 
Dependency 
and 
cooperation 
with business 
community 
Dependency 
and 
cooperation 
with EU and 
supranational 
organisations 
Financial 
Situation, 
very poor 
(1) to 
very 
good (5) 
Population 
Albania  4.93 …   2.55 66339 
Belgium  5.91    3.51 27050 
Croatia  4.75    3.31 29032 
Cyprus  6.40    3.43 32317 
Czech 
Republic 
 6.09    3.98 28919 
Germany  5.20    2.89 31002 
Greece  4.29    3.27 60289 
Hungary  6.98    3.21 32548 
Iceland  5.00    3.20 39453 
Ireland  5.00    3.82 . 
Israel  4.92    3.46 56800 
Italy  3.50    3.15 31170 
Latvia  6.17    3.29 22193 
Lithuania  5.62    3.47 46299 
Norway  6.23    3.36 21598 
Poland  6.33    3.61 36416 
Portugal  4.46    3.50 85851 
Serbia  4.78    2.96 42123 
Slovakia  5.71    3.28 54066 
Slovenia  4.32    3.63 34104 
Spain  3.39    3.26 44601 
Sweden  4.86    3.72 37324 
Switzerland  5.44    3.51 29760 
England  5.41    3.26 228177 
France  5.10    3.43 31346 
Austria  4.61    3.59 23711 
Denmark  5.67    3.39 46457 
Netherlands  5.26    . . 
Romania  6.38    3.13 54523 
Total 
(average) 
 4.96    3.27 40670 
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Table 9: Regression models on single domains of Just City policies (including EU-orientation as control for all models) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Need for housing intervention Public service delivery Integrated programs (dummy) 
    
Openness to community 
involvement 
0.0281*** -0.00358 0.0419 
 (3.43) (-0.92) (1.70) 
Dependency and 
cooperation with local 
business community 
-0.0715 -0.0890* -0.526 
 (-0.87) (-2.24) (-1.85) 
Dependency and 
cooperation with EU and 
supranational organisations 
-0.0623** 0.0108 0.146* 
 (-3.25) (1.16) (2.57) 
Left-right self-positioning 
(0-10) 
-0.128*** -0.0559*** 0.0153 
 (-12.38) (-11.22) (0.49) 
Mayoral perception of 
municipal financial 
situation 
-0.0391 -0.0102 -0.00449 
 (-1.87) (-1.04) (-0.08) 
City type (reference: city 
beyond a larger functional 
urban area) 
   
- core city of larger 
functional urban area 
0.0994 -0.0899* -0.104 
 (1.33) (-2.51) (-0.49) 
- commuting zone of larger 
functional urban area 
0.0359 -0.00742 -0.155 
 (0.75) (-0.32) (-1.08) 
Municipal population size 
(log.) 
-0.0196 0.0139 0.190 
 (-0.57) (0.85) (1.94) 
Constant 3.766*** 2.473***  
 (10.04) (13.90)  
R2 0.117 0.101  
Pseudo-R2   0.015 
N 1900 1903 1889 
t statistics in parentheses. OLS regressions for models 1 and 2, binomial logistic regression for model 3. All 
models with country fixed effects (not reported). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 10: Binomial logistic regressions explaining probability of a mayor to adhere to the single clusters (including EU-
orientation as control for all models) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Cluster_1: 
Limited-sectoral 
Cluster_2: 
Sectoral-interventionist 
Cluster_3: 
Integrated 
    
Openness to community 
involvement 
-0.0549** 0.0144 0.0440* 
 (-2.66) (0.58) (2.01) 
Dependency and 
cooperation with local 
business community 
0.299 0.00175 -0.363 
 (1.47) (0.01) (-1.57) 
Dependency and 
cooperation with EU and 
supranational organisations 
-0.0148 -0.191*** 0.165** 
 (-0.31) (-3.31) (3.29) 
Left-right self-positioning 
(0-10) 
0.187*** -0.302*** 0.0300 
 (7.00) (-9.20) (1.08) 
Mayoral perception of 
municipal financial 
situation 
0.0732 0.00439 -0.0672 
 (1.42) (0.07) (-1.27) 
City type (reference: city 
beyond a larger functional 
urban area) 
   
- core city of larger 
functional urban area 
-0.148 0.148 0.0114 
 (-0.78) (0.69) (0.06) 
- commuting zone of larger 
functional urban area 
-0.154 0.309* -0.0521 
 (-1.31) (2.14) (-0.42) 
Municipal population size 
(log.) 
-0.242** 0.109 0.191* 
 (-2.80) (1.09) (2.17) 
Pseudo-R2 0.040 0.067 0.015 
N 1784 1781 1789 
t statistics in parentheses. All models with country fixed effects (not reported). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
